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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008
An original bill to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to modernize and streamline the provisions of that Act, and for other purposes.
Other Bill Titles (5 more)Hide Other Bill Titles- Official: An original bill to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to modernize and streamline the provisions of that Act, and for other purposes. as introduced.
- Short: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 as passed senate.
- Short: FISA Amendments Act of 2008 as passed senate.
- Short: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2007 as reported to senate.
- Short: FISA Amendments Act of 2007 as reported to senate.
2/12/2008--Passed Senate amended. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 or FISA Amendments Act of 2008 - Title I: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance -
(Sec. 101) Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to add a new title concerning additional procedures for acquiring the communications of certain persons outside the United States. Authorizes the Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly authorize, for periods up to one year, the targeting (electronic surveillance) of persons located outside the United States in order to acquire foreign intelligence information, under specified limitations, including:
(1) prohibiting an acquisition intentionally targeting a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States in order to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States, unless done in accordance with titles I or III of FISA; and
(2) requiring the targeting to be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Requires:
(1) certain targeting and minimization procedures to be followed; and
(2) prior to such targeting, a certification by the AG and DNI as to the necessity of such targeting and that appropriate procedures will be followed. Allows the AG and DNI, if immediate targeting is determined to be required, to commence such targeting, but to submit the certification within seven days of such determination. Requires all certifications to be submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Court) for review. Authorizes the AG and DNI to direct an electronic communication service provider to:
(1) immediately provide the government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish an acquisition; and
(2) maintain under security procedures any records concerning such acquisition. Outlines legal procedures with respect to directive challenges, standards for review, enforcement, and appeals. Provides for:
(1) judicial review of certifications and targeting and minimization procedures; and
(2) review of Court rulings by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (with certiorari to the Supreme Court). Requires the maintenance and security of records and proceedings with respect to acquisition applications, orders, and determinations. Requires the AG and DNI, at least every six months, to:
(1) assess compliance with required targeting and minimization procedures; and
(2) submit assessment results to the Court and the congressional intelligence committees. Authorizes inspectors general of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and elements of the intelligence community (IC) authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information to review their agency or element's compliance with such procedures and provide review results to the AG, DNI, and intelligence committees. Requires the head of any IC element conducting an acquisition of foreign intelligence information to annually review such acquisitions and report review results to the Court, the AG, the DNI, and the intelligence committees. Provides Court jurisdiction for the targeting of a U.S. person located outside the United States when the acquisition of information is conducted within the United States. Requires an application for such acquisition to be made by a federal officer (and approved by the AG), and to contain certain requirements, including that the target is believed to be a foreign power or agent, officer, or employee of a foreign power. Provides for judicial review of a Court order approving such an acquisition. Makes approval orders effective for 90 days, with authorized 90-day renewals. Allows the AG to authorize an emergency acquisition of such a target under certain circumstances, including:
(1) determining that an emergency exists;
(2) informing a Court judge of such determination; and
(3) applying within seven days for a Court order authorizing such surveillance. Provides similar Court jurisdiction and outlines similar procedures for the acquisition (and emergency acquisition) of a physical search. Authorizes the:
(1) joint applications and concurrent approvals of requests for acquisitions proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United States; and
(2) concurrent authorizations of electronic surveillance and physical searches. Directs the AG to report semiannually to the intelligence and judiciary committees concerning the implementation of acquisition requirements.
(Sec. 102) States that FISA and the procedures of chapters 119 (Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications), 121 (Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access), and 206 (Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices) of the federal criminal code shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be conducted.
(Sec. 103) Requires the AG to submit semiannually to the intelligence committees copies of any orders of the Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include significant construction or interpretation of FISA, including any such orders issued during the five-year period before the enactment of this Act. Allows for the redaction of submitted materials for the protection of national security.
(Sec. 104) Revises provisions concerning the application for, and issuance of, Court orders, including provisions concerning paperwork requirements and government officials who may authorize FISA actions.
(Sec. 105) Allows the AG to authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the AG, among other things:
(1) determines that an emergency exists;
(2) informs a Court judge of such determination; and
(3) applies for a Court order authorizing such surveillance.
(Sec. 107) Provides similar revisions and outlines similar procedures as in sections 104 and 105 above for the emergency employment of physical searches.
(Sec. 108) Requires the AG, after authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device on an emergency basis, to apply to the Court for an authorization order within seven days (current law requires 48 hours) after the emergency installation and use.
(Sec. 109) Authorizes the Court to sit en banc when:
(1) necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of Court decisions; or
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(Sec. 110) Authorizes the acquisition of foreign intelligence information in order to prevent the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Title II: Protections for Electronic Communication Service Providers -
(Sec. 202) Prohibits an action against an electronic communication service provider (provider) if the AG certifies to the court involved that the assistance was:
(1) in connection with an intelligence activity authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, and designed to prevent a terrorist attack or related activities against the United States; and
(2) described in a written request or directive from the AG or head of an IC element to the provider indicating that the activity was authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. Subjects AG certifications to review for abuse of discretion. Requires the court involved to review in camera and ex parte a declaration by the AG that disclosure of a certification would harm national security.
(Sec. 203) Provides a similar prohibition and certification requirements as above in the case of actions against individuals other than providers furnishing requested assistance to an IC element.
(Sec. 204) Prohibits a state from conducting investigations, imposing sanctions, or commencing or maintaining a civil action or other proceeding against a provider furnishing requested assistance. Title III: Other Provisions -
(Sec. 301) Provides severability protections for this Act and its amendments.
(Sec. 302) Repeals FISA provisions made inconsistent by provisions of this Act. Outlines transition procedures.
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Sponsor
Amendments
This bill has 69 amendments. See All AmendmentsHide All Amendments
Amendments to S.2248
| Number | Status | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| S.Amdt.3857 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3858 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3859 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3862 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3863 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3866 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3901 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3902 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3903 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3905 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3907 | Fail | To strike the provisions providing immunity from civil liability to electronic communication service providers for certain assistance provided to the Government. |
| S.Amdt.3908 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3909 | Pass | To require that certain records be submitted to Congress. |
| S.Amdt.3910 | Offered | To provide a statement of the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and interception of certain communications may be conducted. |
| S.Amdt.3911 | Pass | In the nature of a substitute. |
| S.Amdt.3912 | Fail | To modify the requirements for certifications made prior to the initiation of certain acquisitions. |
| S.Amdt.3913 | Fail | To prohibit reverse targeting and protect the rights of Americans who are communicating with people abroad. |
| S.Amdt.3914 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3915 | Fail | To place flexible limits on the use of information obtained using unlawful procedures. |
| S.Amdt.3916 | Withdrawn | Of a perfecting nature. |
| S.Amdt.3917 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3918 | Withdrawn | Relative to the extension of the Protect America Act of 2007. |
| S.Amdt.3919 | Offered | To provide for the review of certifications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. |
| S.Amdt.3920 | Pass | To clarify that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has the authority to determine and enforce compliance with any order or rule of, or procedure approved by, such Court. |
| S.Amdt.3921 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3922 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3923 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3924 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3925 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3926 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3927 | Fail | To provide for the substitution of the United States in certain civil actions. |
| S.Amdt.3928 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3929 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3930 | Offered | To modify the sunset provision. |
| S.Amdt.3931 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3932 | Pass | To provide for implementation of an order pending appeal. |
| S.Amdt.3933 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3934 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3935 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3936 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3937 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3938 | Pass | To include prohibitions on the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. |
| S.Amdt.3939 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3940 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3941 | Pass | To expedite the review of challenges to directives under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. |
| S.Amdt.3942 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3943 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3944 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3945 | Pass | To strike the time limitation for certain appeals. |
| S.Amdt.3946 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3947 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3948 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3949 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3950 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3951 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3952 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3953 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3954 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3955 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3956 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3957 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3958 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3959 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3960 | Pass | To clarify that the authority under title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 does not extend to purely domestic communications. |
| S.Amdt.3969 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3970 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3977 | Offered | Amendment information not available. |
| S.Amdt.3979 | Fail | To provide safeguards for communications involving persons inside the United States. |
| S.Amdt.4018 | Pass | To make technical corrections. |
Bill Status
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| Introduced |  | Voted on by Senate |  | Voted on by House | | Considered By President | | Bill Becomes Law |
| October 26, 2007 | February 12, 2008 |
Latest Vote
| February 12, 2008Roll call number 19 in the Senate | |||
| Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture Re. S. 2248 ) | |||
| Required percentage of 'Aye' votes: 3/5 (60%) | Percentage of 'aye' votes: 69% | Result: Cloture Motion Agreed to | |
Democrats Voting 'Aye'
Sen. Max Baucus [D, MT]Sen. B. Evan Bayh [D, IN]
Sen. Thomas Carper [D, DE]
Sen. Robert Casey [D, PA]
Sen. Kent Conrad [D, ND]
Sen. Dianne Feinstein [D, CA]
Sen. Daniel Inouye [D, HI]
Sen. Tim Johnson [D, SD]
Sen. Herbert Kohl [D, WI]
Sen. Mary Landrieu [D, LA]
Sen. Blanche Lincoln [D, AR]
Sen. Claire McCaskill [D, MO]
Sen. Barbara Mikulski [D, MD]
Sen. Ben Nelson [D, NE]
Sen. Bill Nelson [D, FL]
Sen. Mark Pryor [D, AR]
Sen. John Rockefeller [D, WV]
Sen. Ken Salazar [D, CO]
Sen. Jim Webb [D, VA]
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse [D, RI]
Republicans Voting 'Aye'
Sen. Lamar Alexander [R, TN]Sen. Wayne Allard [R, CO]
Sen. John Barrasso [R, WY]
Sen. Robert Bennett [R, UT]
Sen. Christopher Bond [R, MO]
Sen. Samuel Brownback [R, KS]
Sen. Jim Bunning [R, KY]
Sen. Richard Burr [R, NC]
Sen. C. Saxby Chambliss [R, GA]
Sen. Thomas Coburn [R, OK]
Sen. Thad Cochran [R, MS]
Sen. Norm Coleman [R, MN]
Sen. Susan Collins [R, ME]
Sen. Bob Corker [R, TN]
Sen. John Cornyn [R, TX]
Sen. Larry Craig [R, ID]
Sen. Michael Crapo [R, ID]
Sen. Jim DeMint [R, SC]
Sen. Elizabeth Dole [R, NC]
Sen. Pete Domenici [R, NM]
Sen. John Ensign [R, NV]
Sen. Michael Enzi [R, WY]
Sen. Charles Grassley [R, IA]
Sen. Judd Gregg [R, NH]
Sen. Charles Hagel [R, NE]
Sen. Orrin Hatch [R, UT]
Sen. Kay Hutchison [R, TX]
Sen. James Inhofe [R, OK]
Sen. John Isakson [R, GA]
Sen. Jon Kyl [R, AZ]
Sen. Richard Lugar [R, IN]
Sen. Mel Martinez [R, FL]
Sen. John McCain [R, AZ]
Sen. Mitch McConnell [R, KY]
Sen. Lisa Murkowski [R, AK]
Sen. Pat Roberts [R, KS]
Sen. Jefferson Sessions [R, AL]
Sen. Richard Shelby [R, AL]
Sen. Gordon Smith [R, OR]
Sen. Olympia Snowe [R, ME]
Sen. Arlen Specter [R, PA]
Sen. Ted Stevens [R, AK]
Sen. John Sununu [R, NH]
Sen. John Thune [R, SD]
Sen. David Vitter [R, LA]
Sen. George Voinovich [R, OH]
Sen. John Warner [R, VA]
Rep. Roger Wicker [R, MS-1]
Democrats Voting 'Nay'
Sen. Daniel Akaka [D, HI]Sen. Joseph Biden [D, DE]
Sen. Jeff Bingaman [D, NM]
Sen. Barbara Boxer [D, CA]
Sen. Sherrod Brown [D, OH]
Sen. Robert Byrd [D, WV]
Sen. Maria Cantwell [D, WA]
Sen. Benjamin Cardin [D, MD]
Sen. Christopher Dodd [D, CT]
Sen. Byron Dorgan [D, ND]
Sen. Richard Durbin [D, IL]
Sen. Russell Feingold [D, WI]
Sen. Thomas Harkin [D, IA]
Sen. Edward Kennedy [D, MA]
Sen. John Kerry [D, MA]
Sen. Amy Klobuchar [D, MN]
Sen. Frank Lautenberg [D, NJ]
Sen. Patrick Leahy [D, VT]
Sen. Carl Levin [D, MI]
Sen. Robert Menendez [D, NJ]
Sen. Patty Murray [D, WA]
Sen. Barack Obama [D, IL]
Sen. John Reed [D, RI]
Sen. Harry Reid [D, NV]
Sen. Charles Schumer [D, NY]
Sen. Debbie Ann Stabenow [D, MI]
Sen. Jon Tester [D, MT]
Sen. Ron Wyden [D, OR]
Voting History
| Date | Chamber | Question | Aye | Nay | Result | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture Re. S. 2248 ) |
69 | 29 | Cloture Motion Agreed to | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment (Feinstein Amdt. No. 3919 ) |
41 | 57 | Amendment Rejected | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment (Specter Amdt. No. 3927 ) |
30 | 68 | Amendment Rejected | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment (Feingold Amdt. No. 3912 ) |
37 | 60 | Amendment Rejected | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment (Dodd Amdt. No. 3907 ) |
31 | 67 | Amendment Rejected | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment (Feingold Amdt. No. 3979 ) |
35 | 63 | Amendment Rejected | See Vote |
| February 12, 2008 | Senate |
S.2248 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 On the Amendment |
57 |
Rating Filter: 5
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Comments
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Displaying 1-30 of 33 total comments.
Telecoms should not be granted immunity from suits alleging that they violate citizen's civil rights when they wiretap domestic phone lines without a warrant.
Let the courts decide if the telecoms acted illegally. Congress shouldn't simply grant immunity for fear of looking weak on terrorism.
Filtered Comment [show]
In general, citizens cannot sue the government unless there's a specific law that says that they can. There's no such law in this case, so there can be no suit against the government here. If this bill passes, we'll never, ever know what really happened with the wiretaps.
Just like judicial, legislative
and executive branches are separate
entities in our government process,
corporate America should be separate
as well. They should not be helping
government violate our rights to
privacy, especially without probable
cause, reasonable suspicion or
oversight.
Fact is, they are complicit to the
Bush Adminstration's scheme of violating
FISA and immunity should not be
tolerated by the People.
A good corporate citizen? People are citizens - not corporations. Also complying with illegal actions is not good. If there is a grave threat posted by international terrorists, then let's hold a national referendum on wiretapping American citizens. If the telecoms are going to spy on Americans, they need to do so with the consent on the people.
The distribution of personal phone calls is a direct violation of the 4th amendment. The bill is not going to tract only international phone calls it is going to tract all phone calls. If this bill becomes law then the neither the govt nor the corporations will be held to any form of acountability, and all that is doing is taking away citizen power over corporations and govt. The govt is suposto work for us not the other way around.
To keep the example simple, it is certainly in your best interest as a citizen to obey a police officer, but just as when you know that your own constitutional rights are being trampled, you can be compliant, and still follow through in filing a complaint with Internal Affairs, or the officers Sergent. Do not understand how helping an officer violate the rights of another to be any different. Further, you mention this was "to track communications with International terrorists". FISA was a bill that set out the rules for how that was going to take place, and AT&T, Version, and these other Telecoms with an imho corrupt sector of government broke those rules. As I believe Lewis Black put it, "It is just that perfectly legal thing that requires immunity". If we can't play by our own rules, how are we any better than the problems we are trying to solve. This was DOMESTIC WARRENTLESS wiretapping of CITIZENS. I was under the impression the 4th amendment gave this a perfectly moot point a long time ago.
OzarkGuru:
The "I was just following orders" defense was pretty well defeated about 60 years ago.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Defense
If telecoms did nothing wrong, they do not need immunity--especially legislated immunity.
HEY, If the requests ARE LAWFUL, then why do the all TELECOMM/corporations need immunity interjected into the FISA Bill?
Blatant Violations of the CONSTITUTION... send all of them to PRISON
Filtered Comment [show]
The list of democratic senators voting against the Dodd amendment, from
http://www.boomantribune.com/story/2008/2/12/115245/547
Bayh (D-IN), Carper (D-DE), Conrad (D-ND), Feinstein (D-CA), Inouye (D-HI), Johnson (D-SD), Kohl (D-WI), Landrieu (D-LA), Lieberman (ID-CT), Lincoln (D-AR), McCaskill (D-MO), Mikulski (D-MD), Nelson (D-FL), Nelson (D-NE), Pryor (D-AR), Rockefeller (D-WV), Salazar (D-CO) Stabenow (D-MI), Webb (D-VA)
Obama showed up to vote...Clinton did not.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2008-20
According to the above site, Obama did not show up to vote. Maybe I am missing your point???
Obama showed up to vote in favor of the Dodd amendment. He didn't bother showing up for the ultimate vote, because it was obvious it was going to pass.
Once again Feinstein shows her true colors. I, being from California, and one of her constituents, will NEVER vote for her again. Unfortunately, she is in office until 2012, so we have 4 more years of this traitor. I'm a Democrat and very, very ashamed of her. God help us all.
The very concept of retroactive guilt or innocence or liability or immunity is to utterly foreign to our system of law that I simply can't believe that it's being given serious consideration...and in fact it appears to be about to become law.
My personal theory about this is that the widespread spying being done without warrants or supervision is being used to gather enough dirt on the members of Congress that most of them can be sufficiently blackmailed or extorted to go along with pretty much whatever is demanded of them. As far as the telecoms, they've gotten some pretty sweet deals from the last couple of administrations (Democrat and Republican), so they have a pretty strong incentive to play ball, especially when they're told that, by definition, anything and everything they do is, if not legal, at least not something for which they can be prosecuted or sued.
Why would anyone need retroactive immunity from anything unless they were doing something wrong, and knew only too well that they were doing something wrong?
This bill should have never passed giving the telecommunication company's immunity.I can't believe the senators did not defeat this bill.Can it be that Bush has something on these senators that they are so scared to against him.This is another issue that the american people have no voice in.The fear factor is not going to work for Bush this time.
It's not a matter of whether the Telecoms did anything illegal or not. Much like the rest of politics, the illusion of doing something illegal is just as bad.
Providing immunity doesn't lay blame. Arguing "if they didn't do anything wrong, they don't need immunity" is tantamount to saying, "If you didn't commit a crime, why care if the government looks at your stuff?"
It's time we took our freedoms back and it appears that this bill is the perfect soapbox for Democrats to stand on and call out those who have taken them from us. Who will stand?
Filtered Comment [show]
A labyrinthine ammendment fuelled by paranoia. It's only certain effect will be a flood of financing to black hole operations.
I have a question for all you very smart people....why does Harry Reid allow the repubs to 'fillibuster' all the bills they want to by just saying 'we fillibuster', and then make Senator Dodd actually stand up and physically FILLIBUSTER?? Is there any way we can get rid of Harry, and get Senator Dodd in as the Majority Leader? Harry is basically useless.
to marilynb21:
...you need a 2/3 majority to get cloture on a filibuster- the Democrats aren't there yet, and wont be under any leadership.
Most of the concerns here seem to be centered on the revision of FISA dealing with telecom immunity, ... which I agree with. Basically the telecom's did indeed break the law at the executive office's request, but they still went against current law (and subverted the spirit of the constitution if you ask me) by providing details about their clients to the Feds. Concerns over becoming a big brother state aside, we have a perfectly reasonable procedures law enforcement can follow to obtain warrants allowing access which telecoms must follow. There is absolutely no need (or desire, hopefully) to allow law enforcement access to any line they please at any time without oversight. I hope people are familiar with studies that found upwards of 85% of (currently) illegal were useless and unnecessary (sorry, I forget the source) so why should the American public be gung ho about bringing the telecoms onboard to giving them less oversight legally?
I really hope the people that are roiled at this addendum can take a second to write to their rep and ask them to Vote Nay.
So how did Kerry vote in the final bill?
I ask this because he has recieved money from Verizon.
Kerry voted "Nay".
Here is a link to a list of the top 20 latest recipients of contributions from telephone companies... http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=B08&cycle=2008 (From the Center of Responsive Politics)
Dear Sir: The following is a very important concern of mine and others that are having the same experience as myself. I would like it know that this country or any other country cannot survive with such outrageous tactics. Spying, doing harm to Citizens of this great nation is most dangerous to the ongoing of civil liberties. It is most urgent that the Congress of this country take action against such activities. Sincerely, L E Richards
:
Harm done to U S Citizens
Satellites used by the U S Government for national security is being use for surveillance and harming U S Citizens
The Federal Government has placed in space, for national security reasons Space Stations to observe areas along the coast and throughout the country, thinking that we my be attacked by our enemies. Of course, some individuals in the Government, citizens too, believes that any and all means are necessary to protect and defend the citizens of this Great Nation, and I agree. The thing is, these Satellites can and are being used for seeking out and disrupting individuals from their normal everyday activities. Satellite technology is a dastardly thing to citizens in any country when that technology becomes a controlling factor to those citizens living “the pursuit of happiness’ dream.
I’m not crying out for myself alone. I am convinced others are being affected by the government, being spied upon and done harm. These satellites are affecting many of this country’s citizens, people who have no intention of disrupting the government. People I know and love, are being attacked and penetrated in a harmful way; and, I’m thinking, these citizens are unawares of what’s happening to them, not realizing their infirmity could and are being created by the U S Government Satellites program and their coordinators. I am personally dumbfounded at how many people I know, or had known, have illnesses that could very well be the result of harmful vibrations that originate from satellites.
I’m hoping you aren’t thinking “what an imagination, satellites doing harm to a United States citizen”? Naturally, not having any real proof on my part, I could refer to the News Media, where reports have come out that Satellites are capable of impeding citizens from their normal existence. I’m sure the people of this great nation would like to know if they said something, whether meaningful or off the cuff, with no intention of changing the society in which they live, that they could easily be tormented. Even government employees and elected office members could be under surveillance and done harm, without them even knowing it. Individuals can be located and monitored, in the home, driving a car, even grocery shopping; and, unless the individual becomes concealed and/or are no longer identified, they can be harmed by the U S Government Satellites Program. The End
lawrence Richards law_richards@yahoo.com
7272 landsdale st.
brooksville, fl.
352-585-5466
It's long past time to strip corporations of personhood as granted by the supreme Court. That a bill to grant retroactive immunity from prosecution for past criminal acts is even proposed much less passed shows how near we are to paralleling the end of the ancient Roman Republic. Next imperial presidents who first claim to be chosen by God then claim to be God
Telecommunications firms should not receive immunity for conducting illegal data-mining experiments on the web traffic and phone calls of citizens. End of story.
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